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wORDS

NOT

defendant, during the course of a public address,
said of the plaintiff, an attorney: "They are throwing the bum out. The
politicians ••• pick up a bum in a gin mill and send him over here to break up
the audiences.•••" Plaintiff alleges that, by innuendo, these words charge him
with being an habitual drunkard, which constitutes slander per se because the
words prejudiced him in his profession. Held, that the words were not actionable
per se. W eidbergv. La Guardia, 170 Misc. 374, ION. Y. S. (2d) 445 (1939).
Where spoken words tend to injure the plaintiff in his office, profession or
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trade, they are slanderous per se.1 But before spoken words can thus injure the
plaintiff they must (I) have been spoken of the plaintiff in direct relation to his
office, profession or trade, 2 or ( 2) have impugned his integrity 8 or ability
essential to the due conduct of his occupation. The office, profession or trade
need not, however, be expressly referred to if the charge made is such as must
necessarily affect it. In determining whether the words used will necessarily
affect him in his office, profession or trade, regard must be had to the rank and
position of the person and to the mental and moral requirements for the office
he holds. Thus to impute habitual drunkenness;' profane language/ or immorality/ to a clergyman is actionable per se. But to charge a physician,7 or a stay
maker,8 or a clerk,9 with drunkenness is not actionable per se. While a sound
distinction may well be drawn between the clergy and other professions as
regards charges of drunkenness, the court in this case properly refused to attempt
any distinction between the other professions, e.g., physicians and lawyers, in
this respect. Statements implying insolvency to a merchant are actionable per se,1°
but this is not true of the same statements made in regard to persons engaged
in occupations where credit is not as essential, e.g., physicians, attorneys, etc.
Furthermore, when the words convey only a general imputation upon character,
1

Secor v. Harris, 18 Barb. (N. Y.) 425 (1854); Morasse v. Brochu, 151 Mass.
567 (1i90); Singer v. Bender, 64 Wis. 169 (1885); Blumhardt v. Rohr, 70 Md.
328 (1889).
2
Fitzgerald v. Redfield, 51 Barb. (N. Y.) 484 (1868) {"he is no mechanic,,,
said of a mechanic). See also, Burtch v. Nickerson, 17 Johns. (N. Y.) 217 {1819);
Trimmer v. Hiscock, 27 Hun (34 N. Y. S. Ct.) 364 (1882); Singer v. Bender,
64 Wis. 169 {1885).
8
Dolloway v. Turrill, 26 Wend. (N. Y.) 383 (1841) {bribery). Also Hand v.
Winton, 38 N. J. L. 122 {1875); Sanderson v. Caldwell, 45 N. Y. 398 (1871);
Chipman v. Cook, 2 Tyler (Vt.) 456 (1803) {"he is not a man of integrity and is
not to be trusted; he will take fees on both sides of :i cause,,, said of an attorney).
4-Dod v. Robinson, Al. 62, 82 Eng. Rep. 917 (1681); Hayner v. Cowden,
27 Ohio St. 292 {1875); Chaddock v. Briggs, 13 Mass. 248 {1816). But see,
Brandvick v. Johnson, I Viet. L. R. {C. L.) 306 {1875) (charging a schoolmaster
with being drunk once, not actionable per se). This is in keeping with the distinction
often drawn by the courts between alleged slander referring to the conduct of plaintiff
on one occasion only and reference to a continued course of conduct. See also, Dooling
v. Budget Pub. Co., 144 Mass. 258, ION. E. 809 (1887) (of a restaurant keeper, that
he had served a bad meal); Bearce v. Bass, 88 Me. 521, 34 A. 4II {1896) (of a contractor, that he had done a bad piece of work); Amick v. Montross, 206 Iowa 51, 220
N. W. 51 (1928) {that a physician was once too drunk to attend a patient).
11
Cole v. Millspaugh, 1 II Minn. 159, 126 N. W. 626 (1910).
11
Gallwey v. Marshall, 9 Exch. 294, 156 Eng. Rep. 126 {1853).
7
Ayre v. Craven, 2 Ad. & E. 2, III Eng. Rep. I {1834); Anonymous, 1 Ohio
83, note {1823).
8
Brayne v. Cooper, 5 M. & W. 249, I 5 I Eng. Rep. 106 ( 18 39).
9
Lumby v. Allday, 1 C. & J. 301, 148 Eng. Rep. 1434 (1831).
10
Sewall v. Catlin, 3 Wend. (N. Y.) 291 (1829); Mott v. Comstock, 7 Cow.
(N. Y.) 654 {1827); Phillips v. Hoefer, I Pa. 62 (1845); Hayes v. Press Co.,
127 Pa. St. 642 (1889).
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equally injurious to anyone about whom they might be spoken, they are not
actionable unless the imputation on character is directly applied to the office,
profession, or trade of the plaintiff.11 The language in question in this case
~eems to be in ·the nature of a general imputation on character, not directly related to the plaintiff's profession, hence not actionable per se.

Roy L. Steinheimer, Jr.

11 Abuse in general terms, such as "cheat," "rogue," "knave," etc., is not actionable per se. But to say, ''You cheat your clients," is actionable per se. See Alleston v.
Moor, Hetl. 167, 124 Eng. Rep. 426 (1627); Bishop v. Latimer, 4 L. T. 775
(1861); and see 9 BACON, ABRIDGEMENT 51 (1846).

